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NOTE

RECLAIMING ACCESS TO TRUTH IN REPRODUCTIVE
HEALTHCARE AFTER NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FAMILY &
LIFE ADVOCATES V. BECERRA
Diane Kee*
Crisis Pregnancy Centers (CPCs) are antiabortion organizations that seek to
“intercept” people with unintended pregnancies to convince them to forego
abortion. It is well documented that CPCs intentionally present themselves as
medical professionals even when they lack licensure, while also providing
medically inaccurate information on abortion. To combat the blatant deception committed by CPCs, California passed the Reproductive FACT Act in
2015. The Act required CPCs to post notices that disclosed their licensure status and informed potential clients that the state provided subsidized abortion
and contraceptives. Soon after, CPCs brought First Amendment challenges to
these disclosure requirements, claiming that the state could not compel them
to speak a message against their will. In 2018, the Supreme Court decided
National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (NIFLA) v. Becerra and
constitutionalized CPCs’ efforts to evade regulation from state-mandated
compelled disclosures—disclosures not dissimilar to those regularly imposed
on other businesses and medical professionals.
Although CPCs use the guise of professionalism to increase their credibility,
they are not held to the same standards as actual medical professionals.
States can force abortion providers to violate ethical codes by requiring them
to give patients medically inaccurate information as “informed consent,” yet
CPCs cannot be compelled to say anything because they are not real professionals. This Note argues that while there are striking parallels between abortion-related informed consent laws and compelled informational disclosures
like the CPC disclosures at issue in NIFLA, the Court has refused to treat
pro-choice speech in a manner similar to antiabortion speech. Moreover,
though NIFLA has drastically limited the types of CPC regulations that prochoice governments can implement, there are still ways in which these states
can and should curb CPCs’ deceptive practices.

* J.D. Candidate, May 2021, University of Michigan Law School. Thank you to Professors Don Herzog and Daniel Halberstam for invaluable feedback and guidance in this process.
I am exceptionally grateful for the support I received from the Notes Editors of Volumes 118
and 119, with a special thank you to Maggie Turner. Finally, thank you to my wonderful parents, my friends, Kevin, and Wallace for their unconditional love that I could not do without.

175

176

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 119:175

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................176
I. COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE AND CRISIS PREGNANCY
CENTER DISCLOSURES .....................................................................179
A. When Speech May Be Compelled............................................180
B. Compelled Speech in Crisis Pregnancy Centers and
NIFLA........................................................................................183
C. Uneven Application of Compelled Speech Doctrine in the
Abortion Context......................................................................185
II. COMPELLED COMMERCIAL DISCLOSURES UNDER ZAUDERER
AND THE PARALLELS TO INFORMED CONSENT
REQUIREMENTS ................................................................................186
A. Compelled Commercial Disclosures Under Zauderer ..........186
B. Abortion-Related Informed Consent Requirements .............190
C. CPCs as Pseudo-Professionals .................................................192
III. PROPOSING SOLUTIONS ..................................................................197
A. Legislation Prohibiting CPCs from Making False Claims
Guided by Alvarez....................................................................197
B. Using Existing Laws to Regulate CPCs...................................201
C. Torts of Negligent and Fraudulent Misrepresentation .........202
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................203

INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the rapid growth of Crisis Pregnancy Centers (CPCs) in
the United States has alarmed pro-choice legislators and activists. 1 CPCs are

1. See, e.g., Ramiro Ferrando, While Abortion Clinics Diminish, Crisis Pregnancy Centers Flourish, MIDWEST CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Feb. 19, 2019),
https://investigatemidwest.org/2019/02/19/while-abortion-clinics-diminish-crisis-pregnancycenters-flourish/ [https://perma.cc/LU5P-DTV4] (explaining that approximately 500 new
CPCs have opened between 2010 and 2018, overtaking the number of abortion clinics in almost every state); Rebecca Grant, These Clinics Used to Provide Abortions. Now They Are
Owned by Antiabortion Activists., LILY (Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.thelily.com/these-clinicsused-to-provide-abortions-now-they-are-owned-by-antiabortion-activists/ [https://perma.cc
/35L6-G4WX]; Emma Green, Should Pro-Life Clinics Have to Post Information About Abortion?, ATLANTIC (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/03/niflabecerra-crisis-pregnancy-centers-supreme-court/555887/
[https://perma.cc/AV7E-RGBM];
Garnet Henderson, Anti-Choice Clinics Are Changing the Way They Operate to Qualify for
Government Funding, VICE (Jan. 15, 2019, 2:25 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article
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antiabortion organizations that use deceptive practices to draw pregnant
people into their centers, 2 aiming to convince them to carry their pregnancies to term by providing medical misinformation on abortion. 3 CPCs attract
primarily young, low-income clientele by offering free medical services like
sonograms and pregnancy tests. 4 Although CPCs are often unlicensed and
staffed by lay volunteers, they are designed to look like real healthcare facilities, going so far as dressing volunteers in white lab coats and asking clients
to fill out standardized forms to “replicate[] the look and feel of a typical
medical office.” 5 CPCs also use a “co-location” strategy, establishing facilities
near abortion clinics to confuse and intercept pregnant people on their way
to receive actual abortion care. 6 These efforts to obfuscate extend to the digital space, where CPCs have been known to run targeted advertisements for
their facilities atop Google search results for words like “abortion” and
“morning-after pill.” 7 Despite this campaign to link CPCs with abortion services and education, CPCs do not actually provide abortions or abortion referrals. 8 Instead, CPCs provide medically inaccurate information about the
health risks of abortion and intentionally mislead clients into believing that
they can delay seeking abortion care. 9
Pro-choice states and cities have attempted to regulate CPC conduct by
requiring CPCs to inform potential clients of their unlicensed status and to
disclose the availability of state-subsidized abortion and contraceptives. 10 To
avoid making these disclosures, CPCs have successfully raised First
/8xpw8b/crisis-pregnancy-centers-medical-services-government-funding
[https://perma.cc
/L8S6-XDBH].
2. I use the term “pregnant people” rather than “pregnant women,” as it is more inclusive and accurately encapsulates the fact that pregnancy is not a condition exclusive to those
who identify as cisgender women.
3. NAT’L ABORTION FED’N, CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTERS: AN AFFRONT TO CHOICE 1
(2006); NARAL PRO-CHOICE CAL. FOUND., UNMASKING FAKE CLINICS: AN INVESTIGATION
INTO CALIFORNIA’S CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTERS (2015).
4. See Joanne D. Rosen, The Public Health Risks of Crisis Pregnancy Centers, 44 PERSPS.
ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 201, 201 (2012).
5. LISA MCINTIRE, NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM. FOUND., CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTERS
LIE: THE INSIDIOUS THREAT TO REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM 15 (2015); see also Amy G. Bryant &
Jonas J. Swartz, Why Crisis Pregnancy Centers Are Legal but Unethical, 20 AMA J. ETHICS 269,
270–71 (2018) (“[CPCs] strive to appear as sites offering clinical services and unbiased advice.”).
6. MCINTIRE, supra note 5, at 5–6.
7. Id. at 4–5 (noting that two major CPC networks spend $18,000 per month on payper-click advertising to appear prominently in searches for abortion-related terms).
8. Andrea Swartzendruber, Anna Newton-Levinson, Ashley E. Feuchs, Ashley L. Phillips, Jennifer Hickey & Riley J. Steiner, Sexual and Reproductive Health Services and Related
Health Information on Pregnancy Resource Center Websites: A Statewide Content Analysis, 28
WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 14, 14 (2018).
9. See NARAL PRO-CHOICE CAL. FOUND., supra note 3; Rosen, supra note 4, at 202.
10. See Hayley E. Malcolm, Note, Pregnancy Centers and the Limits of Mandated Disclosure, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1133, 1149–58 (2019) (evaluating states’ and cities’ attempts at regulating CPCs and their varying degrees of success).
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Amendment challenges to the regulations, claiming that the state could not
force them to share this information against their will. 11 In 2018, the Supreme Court decided National Institute of Family and Life Advocates
(NIFLA) v. Becerra and constitutionalized CPCs’ efforts to evade regulation
from state-mandated compelled disclosures—disclosures not dissimilar to
those regularly imposed on other businesses and medical professionals. 12 By
finding that disclosures related to licensure and state-subsidized reproductive healthcare were “anything but . . . ‘uncontroversial’ ” and not part of obtaining informed consent for a medical procedure, 13 the NIFLA Court
allowed CPCs to “weaponiz[e] the First Amendment,” 14 leaving vulnerable
people at the other end of the sword.
NIFLA is just the latest example of troublingly uneven application of
First Amendment principles in the abortion-rights context. Since Planned
Parenthood v. Casey was decided in 1992, antiabortion informed consent requirements have grown increasingly extreme, requiring doctors to give medically inaccurate information to abortion patients. 15 When challenged, these
laws must only survive rational basis review. 16 On the other hand, CPCs use
deceptive practices to lure clients into their centers, even dressing their volunteers like doctors to increase credibility. 17 But after NIFLA, a court evaluating a CPC disclosure requirement will apply strict scrutiny, making it
difficult for states to combat CPC deception through speech-related means. 18
This Note argues that while there are striking parallels between abortionrelated informed consent laws and compelled informational disclosures like
the CPC disclosures at issue in NIFLA, the Court has refused to treat prochoice speech in a manner similar to antiabortion speech. Moreover, though
NIFLA has drastically limited the types of CPC regulations that pro-choice
governments can implement, there are still ways in which these states can
and should curb CPCs’ deceptive practices.
Part I traces the development of the commercial speech doctrine and the
prevalence of state-mandated disclosures in commercial settings. Part I also
discusses failed attempts at implementing CPC compelled disclosures and
explains how the holding of NIFLA has foreclosed certain speech-related solutions for preventing CPC deception. Part II further explores the legal
standards that courts use to evaluate compelled commercial speech and describes the similarities between compelled commercial disclosures and informed consent laws. In addition, Part II identifies why it is especially

11. See id. at 1153–58.
12. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
13. See Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. at 2372–73.
14. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501
(2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
15. See infra notes 31–35 and accompanying text.
16. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
17. See supra notes 2–9 and accompanying text.
18. See infra Section II.C.
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troublesome that CPCs operate under the guise of professionalism but cannot be regulated as actual professionals. Lastly, Part III proposes three potential solutions to prevent CPCs from engaging in deceptive practices. First,
even though NIFLA clearly signals that states cannot compel CPCs to make
disclosures, states may still legislate to prohibit CPCs from making false
claims related to pregnancy and abortion. In addition, this Note proposes
two other solutions that intentionally avoid implicating First Amendment
issues altogether—arguably the most prudent path forward for pro-choice
states after NIFLA.
I.

COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE AND CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTER
DISCLOSURES

Before NIFLA, several states and cities implemented CPC disclosure requirements in response to growing evidence that deception and misinformation were integral to CPCs’ strategy of luring unsuspecting people into
their centers. 19 For example, New York City passed a comprehensive CPC
disclosure ordinance after finding that CPCs engaged in deceptive practices,
including misleading clients about the services available at the centers. 20 Although the First Amendment generally prohibits states from compelling an
unwilling speaker to deliver a certain message, this Part begins by discussing
the prevalence of compelled disclosures in the context of commercial speech.
Section I.A also traces the development of the commercial speech doctrine,
which recognizes that speech made for the purpose of effecting a commercial
transaction receives limited First Amendment protection and allows states to
more easily impose compelled disclosures on commercial actors. Section I.B
analyzes how California’s Reproductive FACT Act, the law at issue in
NIFLA, was struck down as an impermissible compelled commercial speech
disclosure. Finally, Part I.C describes courts’ incongruent treatment of prochoice and antiabortion speech, a disparity made most clear when comparing CPC disclosure requirements (which have almost invariably been struck
down) to antiabortion informed consent laws (which have almost always
survived judicial review).

19. See Kathryn E. Gilbert, Note, Commercial Speech in Crisis: Crisis Pregnancy Center
Regulations and Definitions of Commercial Speech, 111 MICH. L. REV. 591, 593–94 (2013) (collecting CPC disclosure statutes and ordinances); Regulating Disclosure of Services and Sponsorship of Crisis Pregnancy Centers, AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N (Nov. 1, 2011),
https://www.apha.org/policies-and-advocacy/public-health-policy-statements/policy-database
/2014/07/22/08/33/regulating-disclosure-of-services-and-sponsorship-of-crisis-pregnancycenters [https://perma.cc/LP7A-CEE2].
20. N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE tit. 20, ch. 5, § 20-816 (2016). The ordinance
required CPCs to inform potential clients that the City’s Department of Health and Mental
Hygiene encouraged pregnant people to seek care from a licensed medical provider and mandated disclosure of whether the CPC was staffed by a licensed medical provider and whether it
provided abortion referrals. § 20-816(a)–(c). These notices were to be posted at the entrance
and in the waiting room of the facility in English and Spanish. § 20-816(f).
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A. When Speech May Be Compelled
It is axiomatic in First Amendment jurisprudence that “freedom of
speech prohibits the government from telling people what they must say.” 21
Nonetheless, the government can compel individuals and organizations to
speak without running afoul of the First Amendment’s general proscription
against compelled speech by legally “requir[ing] them to provide somewhat
more information than they might otherwise be inclined to present.” 22 For
example, attorneys can be compelled to turn over the names and taxidentification numbers of their clients to the IRS, 23 disclose to clients that
they may be liable for other costs even if the attorney is hired on a contingent-fee basis, 24 and inform clients seeking debt-relief assistance that the
firm provides bankruptcy services. 25 Restaurants and food producers can be
required to post calorie counts on menus, 26 label whether the food is a product of genetic engineering, 27 and indicate the country of origin of meats. 28
Tobacco companies have been forced to provide warnings about the dangers
of tobacco use, 29 and cell phone retailers may have to warn consumers about
the risk of excessive exposure to radio-frequency radiation from carrying a
cell phone. 30
States can also compel abortion providers to relay an antiabortion message as part of obtaining a patient’s informed consent for the procedure. 31
For example, Mississippi’s informed consent statute requires providers to tell

21. Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Institutional Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 61 (2006).
22. Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S. 626, 650 (1985).
23. United States v. Sindel, 53 F.3d 874, 878 (8th Cir. 1995).
24. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650.
25. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 252–53 (2010).
26. N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 136 (2d Cir. 2009).
27. Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 102 F. Supp. 3d 583, 635 (D. Vt. 2015).
28. Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
29. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 561, 565 (6th Cir.
2012); Cigar Ass’n of Am. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 315 F. Supp. 3d 143, 189 (D.D.C.
2018).
30. CTIA–The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 928 F.3d 832, 852 (9th Cir. 2019).
31. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (upholding
informed consent requirement for physicians to tell abortion patients about adoption and
child-support resources); EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Beshear, 920 F.3d 421, 423–
24 (6th Cir. 2019) (upholding informed consent law requiring physicians to show an abortion
patient the fetus and play the fetal heartbeat while describing the image to the patient); Tex.
Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 577–78 (5th Cir. 2012)
(same); Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 653 F.3d 662, 667–68 (8th Cir.) (upholding informed consent law requiring doctors to tell abortion patients that they are terminating “the
life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being”), vacated in part on other grounds on
reh’g en banc, 662 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2011), and rev’d in part on other grounds on reh’g en
banc, 686 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2012); Doe v. Parson, 368 F. Supp. 3d 1345, 1347 (E.D. Mo. 2019)
(upholding law requiring physicians to give abortion patients a booklet stating that “[t]he life
of each human being begins at conception,” as part of an informed consent requirement).
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patients that abortion is linked to breast cancer and infertility. 32 Alabama
compels doctors to claim that “[an] unborn child” over nineteen weeks’ gestation may survive outside of the womb. 33 Arizona and Nebraska mandate
that medication-abortion providers inform patients that the effects of mifepristone, the abortion pill, can be reversed after being taken 34—a scientifically inaccurate claim. 35
Courts have identified three main rationales for why states can compel
entities to speak in certain situations. First, the government has a substantial
interest in preventing deception in commercial transactions, which the government effectuates by compelling businesses to make disclosures to consumers. 36 Second, compelled disclosures further the government’s
substantial interest in helping consumers make informed purchasing decisions. 37 And third, in the case of informed consent laws, the government is
said to be regulating the practice of medicine as professional conduct that
incidentally involves speech. 38
Two of these rationales—preventing deception and providing information to consumers—are rooted in a concept known as the commercial
speech doctrine. The doctrine, which developed out of content-based restrictions on advertising, 39 provides an exception to the general rule by allowing the government to restrict private expression based on the content of
the speech. 40 Typically, if a court finds that a law imposes a content-based
restriction on speech, the law must survive strict scrutiny to stand. 41 But the
Supreme Court has treated restrictions on commercial speech—speech that
does “no more than propose a commercial transaction”—quite differently. 42
In Valentine v. Chrestensen, the Court upheld a New York City ordinance

32. MISS. CODE. ANN. § 41-41-33 (2018).
33. ALA. CODE § 26-23A-4 (LexisNexis 2016).
34. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2153 (2018); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-327 (LexisNexis 2015).
35. AM. CONG. OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, FACTS ARE IMPORTANT:
MEDICATION ABORTION “REVERSAL” IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SCIENCE (2017),
https://www.acog.org/-/media/Departments/Government-Relations-and-Outreach/FactsAre
ImportantMedicationAbortionReversal.pdf [https://perma.cc/4X2N-6PQ7].
36. See Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
37. See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 24, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Nat’l
Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2001).
38. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992).
39. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562–63
(1980).
40. See, e.g., Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[T]he First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”).
41. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 118 (1991) (explaining that to justify “differential treatment” of speech based on its
content, the state must show a compelling state interest with narrow tailoring to meet the end).
42. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Hum. Rels., 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973).

182

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 119:175

that prohibited the distribution of handbills for advertising purposes under a
rational basis standard, finding that “the First Amendment categorically did
not apply to restrictions on ‘purely commercial advertising.’ ” 43 After Valentine, however, several cases limited its stringent holding by carving out spaces where some commercial speech could receive First Amendment protecprotection. 44
The Court formally overruled Valentine in 1976 in Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., recognizing for the
first time that speech made solely for commercial purposes merits First
Amendment protection. 45 In Virginia State Board, the Court held that a state
law banning the advertisement of prescription drug prices was an unconstitutional violation of a pharmacist’s First Amendment right to provide
“truthful information about entirely lawful activity.” 46 The Court determined
that First Amendment protection is available even when a speaker’s interest
in promoting a certain message is “purely economic.” 47
Challenges to content-based restrictions on commercial advertising further shaped commercial speech doctrine. In Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, the Court held that contentbased restrictions on commercial speech should only be subject to intermediate scrutiny, a lower standard than the strict scrutiny applied to contentbased restrictions on noncommercial speech. 48 Therefore, Central Hudson
made clear that “the degree of protection afforded by the First Amendment
depends on whether the activity sought to be regulated constitutes commercial or noncommercial speech.” 49
Sensibly, in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., the Court laid out factors to consider when identifying whether speech is commercial—and therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny per Central Hudson. 50 To determine
whether it is dealing with commercial speech, a court asks if (1) the speech is
43. Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional
Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 779 (1999) (quoting Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942)).
44. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 820 (1975) (striking down a ban on advertising abortion by reasoning that Valentine did not hold that all advertising is per se unprotected under the First Amendment); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964)
(finding that a paid advertisement was entitled to First Amendment protection because it “expressed opinion, recited grievances, [and] protested claimed abuses”); Jamison v. Texas, 318
U.S. 413, 417 (1943) (“[The state] may not prohibit the distribution of handbills in the pursuit
of a clearly religious activity merely because the handbills invite the purchase of books . . . or
because the handbills seek in a lawful fashion to promote the raising of funds for religious purposes.”).
45. 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976).
46. Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 773.
47. Id. at 762.
48. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980); Robert Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, 117 W. VA. L.
REV. 867, 883 (2015).
49. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65–68 (1983).
50. Id.
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an advertisement, (2) the speech references a specific product, and (3) the
speaker is economically motivated. 51 In application, the Bolger factors are
not independently dispositive, but when taken together, they may suggest
that speech is commercial. 52
Despite finding that commercial speech deserves constitutional protection, the Court has been adamant that commercial speech holds a “subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values” and receives a more
“limited measure of protection, . . . allowing modes of regulation that might
be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.” 53 As discussed
further in Part II, when the Court eventually confronted the question of
whether a government could compel businesses to say more than they would
otherwise choose (as opposed to restricting commercial speech in prior cases), it continued to apply a relaxed standard of review for compelled disclosures in the commercial context. 54
The Court first decided the issue of compelled commercial speech in
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio. 55 In
Zauderer, the Court held that a state could “prescribe what shall be orthodox
in commercial advertising” when a compelled disclosure required a commercial actor to include “purely factual and uncontroversial information” in
their advertising. 56 The Court relied on this language in NIFLA, determining
that an abortion-related restriction was simply too controversial to be mandated. 57
B. Compelled Speech in Crisis Pregnancy Centers and NIFLA
Crisis Pregnancy Centers (CPCs) are antiabortion organizations “that
seek to intercept women with unintended or ‘crisis’ pregnancies who might
be considering abortion” with the ultimate goal of convincing them to carry
the pregnancy to term instead. 58 Supported by public funds, CPCs are also
notorious for deceiving clients into believing that they will receive actual
medical care from licensed professionals or that they could even obtain an
abortion at the CPC facility. 59

51. Id.; see, e.g., U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Phila., 898 F.2d 914, 933
(3d Cir. 1990) (applying the three Bolger factors).
52. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66–67.
53. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
54. See infra Section II.A.
55. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
56. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
57. Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018) (“The
Zauderer standard does not apply here. Most obviously, the licensed notice is not limited to
‘purely factual and uncontroversial information about the terms under which . . . services will
be available.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651)).
58. Bryant & Swartz, supra note 5, at 269.
59. See MCINTIRE, supra note 5, at 2–4 (explaining that CPCs are designed to “look[]
like a typical women’s clinic,” but if a woman calls a CPC to make an appointment for an abor-
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CPCs commonly offer free pregnancy tests, ultrasounds, STI testing, and
antiabortion counseling, but these services are often administered by volunteers without professional credentials. 60 Moreover, CPC staff frequently give
clients medically inaccurate or misleading information about the physicaland mental-health consequences of abortion. 61 Pregnant people may be told
that abortion is available throughout all nine months of pregnancy or given
an intentional misdiagnosis of gestational age. 62 These objectively false
claims are intended to delay clients from seeking abortion care until it is too
late. 63
Requiring CPCs to make disclosures to potential clients appears to track
all three rationales for permissible compelled speech: to prevent deception,
enhance consumer knowledge, and regulate informed consent for reproductive healthcare. After building a record on CPCs’ deceptive practices and
finding that low-income people targeted by CPCs were unaware that the
state offered subsidized reproductive healthcare, California passed the Reproductive FACT Act in 2015, mandating that CPCs make two key disclosures to potential clients. 64 First, the Act required unlicensed CPCs to post a
notice informing potential clients of their unlicensed status. 65 Second, the
Act required CPCs to display information about obtaining free or low-cost
abortion and contraception from state-funded organizations. 66 Litigation ensued, and in June 2018 the Supreme Court held in NIFLA v. Becerra that
NIFLA was likely to succeed on its First Amendment claim that compelling
CPCs to post these disclosures in their facilities and on their websites was
unconstitutional. 67
In that case, NIFLA sought to enjoin enforcement of the FACT Act, arguing that the disclosures were impermissible compelled speech. 68 The Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit’s affirmance of the District Court’s denial of a
preliminary injunction, holding instead that NIFLA was likely to succeed on

tion, “she is given vague or confusing answers, and told to come to the clinic to discuss in person”); see also ‘Choose Life’ License Plates, GUTTMACHER INST. (May 1, 2020),
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/choose-life-license-plates [https://perma.cc
/6BWX-C8PW]; Kenneth P. Vogel & Robert Pear, Trump Administration Gives Family Planning Grant to Anti-abortion Group, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com
/2019/03/29/us/politics/trump-grant-abortion.html [https://perma.cc/8LLW-DT88].
60. Bryant & Swartz, supra note 5, at 270–71.
61. See MCINTIRE, supra note 5, at 8–10.
62. See Beth Vial, What It Was Like to Get a Later Abortion, TEEN VOGUE (Feb. 8, 2019),
https://www.teenvogue.com/story/what-it-was-like-to-get-a-later-abortion [https://perma.cc
/5PGL-7W2F].
63. MCINTIRE, supra note 5, at 12.
64. Reproductive FACT Act, 2015 Cal. Stat. 5351
65. Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Constitutional Gerrymandering Against
Abortion Rights: NIFLA v. Becerra, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 61, 71 (2019).
66. Id.
67. Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2378 (2018).
68. Id. at 2370.
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the merits of its First Amendment claim. 69 The Court applied strict scrutiny
to the disclosures, rather than deferential Zauderer review, because a bare
majority of the justices concluded that abortion was “anything but an ‘uncontroversial’ topic,” thus failing Zauderer’s “purely factual and uncontroversial” standard for compelled commercial disclosures. 70 The Court’s decladeclaration that abortion is too controversial a topic for disclosure came at a
time when there was disagreement about the precise meaning of “factual”
and “controversial” in the context of evaluating compelled commercial disclosures. 71 Moreover, by finding that the licensing disclosure requirement
was “not an informed-consent requirement or any other regulation of professional conduct,” the Court ruled out using the lower standard of review
applicable to informed consent laws. 72
C. Uneven Application of Compelled Speech Doctrine in the Abortion
Context
In his dissent in NIFLA, Justice Breyer admonished the majority for
drawing distinctions in the abortion context that “lack[] moral, practical,
and legal force,” concluding that the Court had failed to adhere to the principle of evenhandedness that “the rule of law embodies.” 73 The Court’s unequal treatment of abortion issues has not gone unnoticed, 74 and the
imbalanced application of the compelled speech doctrine to reproductive
health disclosure requirements is a prime example. 75 By classifying the California law as a content-based regulation of speech for which neither the
commercial speech nor informed consent doctrines could apply, the Court
afforded CPCs the highest First Amendment protection. But in doing so,
Breyer argued, the NIFLA majority empowered courts to “apply an unpredictable First Amendment to ordinary social and economic regulation, strik-

69. Id.
70. Id. at 2372.
71. See infra Section II.A; see also Note, Repackaging Zauderer, 130 HARV. L. REV. 972,
984 (2017). Although it is beyond the scope of this Note, clarifying descriptive and normative
definitions of what makes a disclosure “controversial” would go a long way toward supporting
the NIFLA Court’s approach of determining controversiality of abortion as a social fact. See,
e.g., Ellen P. Goodman, Visual Gut Punch: Persuasion, Emotion, and the Constitutional Meaning of Graphic Disclosure, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 513, 536, 550–55 (2014); Post, supra note 48, at
910.
72. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373.
73. Id. at 2385 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
74. See, e.g., Teneille R. Brown, Crisis at the Pregnancy Center: Regulating Pseudo-Clinics
and Reclaiming Informed Consent, 30 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 221 (2018); Chemerinsky &
Goodwin, supra note 65; Ian Vandewalker, Abortion and Informed Consent: How Biased Counseling Laws Mandate Violations of Medical Ethics, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1 (2012).
75. See infra Section II.B.
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ing down disclosure laws that judges may disfavor, while upholding others,
all without grounding their decisions in reasoned principle.” 76
As the law stands today, states can force professional abortion providers
to inflate the physical and psychological risks of abortion and can even mandate that providers tell patients that an abortion terminates the life of a separate, unique human being. 77 But states cannot compel CPCs to disclose that
they are unlicensed healthcare providers or that the state provides subsidized
abortion and contraceptive services. 78 Abortion providers can be given a
“legislated script [that] forces them to commit an untenable ethical and professional wrong: deceiving their patients by providing false information and
withholding empirically derived, evidence-based clinical data.” 79 Meanwhile,
CPCs are left free to “formulate their own address” on abortion, 80 which
strategically includes deceptive claims and intentionally withholds accurate
information from clients. 81
II.

COMPELLED COMMERCIAL DISCLOSURES UNDER ZAUDERER AND THE
PARALLELS TO INFORMED CONSENT REQUIREMENTS

As discussed in Part I, the NIFLA Court refused to apply the deferential
review afforded to other compelled commercial disclosures because California’s abortion-related CPC disclosures were too “controversial.” Section II.A
elaborates on the compelled commercial speech doctrine laid out by Zauderer and focuses on courts’ struggles to determine what it means for a disclosure to be “purely factual and uncontroversial” both before and after NIFLA.
Section II.B explains the doctrinal framework governing abortion-related informed consent requirements. Although informed consent laws compel
medical professionals to speak, they are subject only to rational basis review
as a regulation of medical practice—not to the strict scrutiny applied to abortion-related CPC disclosures under NIFLA. Lastly, Section II.C discusses the
troubling implications of allowing CPCs to present themselves as medical
professionals while immunizing them from regulations placed on actual professionals.
A. Compelled Commercial Disclosures Under Zauderer
Traditionally, courts consider the difference between compelled speech
and restricted speech to be “without constitutional significance, for the First
Amendment guarantees ‘freedom of speech,’ a term necessarily comprising

76. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2381 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
77. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
78. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372–78.
79. Howard Minkoff & Mary Faith Marshall, Government-Scripted Consent: When Medical Ethics and Law Collide, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Sept.–Oct. 2009, at 21, 21 (footnote omitted).
80. Evergreen Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 740 F.3d 233, 250 (2d Cir. 2014).
81. See supra notes 2–9 and accompanying text.
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the decision of both what to say and what not to say.” 82 In the commercial
speech context, however, compelled disclosures are treated differently from
restrictions on commercial speech. In fact, the Court has held that compelled
disclosures in commercial speech are entitled to even more deferential review than commercial speech restrictions, which receive intermediate scrutiny. Because compelled disclosures add speech into the marketplace of ideideas, the Court has found that these disclosures serve a key premise of the
commercial speech doctrine: providing consumers with useful factual information to make informed decisions. 83
The Court first evaluated a compelled commercial disclosure in Zauderer and established two important principles. First, states may compel commercial actors to speak when a compelled disclosure requires disseminating
“purely factual and uncontroversial information.” 84 And second, states have
a substantial interest in using disclosures “to dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or deception.” 85 In Zauderer, the Court upheld an Ohio law
that required attorneys who mentioned contingent-fee representation in
their advertisements to disclose that clients are still liable for costs even if
they are unsuccessful. 86 The Court recognized the “material differences between disclosure requirements and outright prohibitions on speech” in the
commercial speech context. 87 In reasoning that “disclosure requirements
trench much more narrowly on an advertiser’s interests than [outright] prohibitions on speech,” the Court deemed that compelled disclosures were entitled to a more deferential standard of review. 88
Specifically, the Court held that compelled disclosures are constitutional
when they are “reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers” and are not “unjustified or unduly burdensome.” 89 This
standard of review is more deferential than the intermediate scrutiny applied
to content-based restrictions on commercial speech, but less deferential than
pure rational basis scrutiny. 90 The Court explained that requiring disclosure

82. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796–97 (1988) (emphasis
omitted).
83. Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) ( “[T]he extension
of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the value to
consumers of the information such speech provides . . . .”); see also Jennifer M. Keighley, Can
You Handle the Truth? Compelled Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 15 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 539, 551 (2012); Post, supra note 48, at 877.
84. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
85. Id. (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 201 (1982)).
86. Id. at 652.
87. Id. at 650.
88. Id. at 650–51, 651 n.14 (“Because the First Amendment interests implicated by disclosure requirements are substantially weaker than those at stake when speech is actually suppressed, we do not think it appropriate to strike down such requirements merely because other
possible means by which the State might achieve its purposes can be hypothesized.”).
89. Id. at 651 (footnote omitted).
90. Post, supra note 48, at 883.
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of “purely factual and uncontroversial information” furthers a consumer’s
interest in receiving accurate information about the terms of service, which
far outweighs an advertiser’s “constitutionally protected interest in not
providing any particular factual information.” 91
In the wake of Zauderer, federal courts did not universally require that
disclosures be “purely factual and uncontroversial” before applying the lower
level of scrutiny associated with compelled commercial disclosures. For example, the Sixth Circuit in Discount Tobacco plainly rejected the notion that
a disclosure must be “purely factual and noncontroversial” in order to receive deferential Zauderer review. 92 The court reasoned that this phrase “appear[ed] in Zauderer once,” and “merely describe[d] the disclosure the Court
faced in that specific instance.” 93 Even courts that did consider “purely factual and uncontroversial” to be a requisite for upholding compelled commercial speech disclosures expressed concerns about the lack of guidance in
interpreting an ambiguous standard. 94
Other courts completely dodged the issue of controversiality, instead
categorizing speech as noncommercial to sidestep Zauderer’s rational basis
review. 95 In Greater Baltimore Center for Pregnancy Concerns v. Mayor of
Baltimore, a pre-NIFLA CPC disclosure case, the Fourth Circuit avoided citing Zauderer altogether by rejecting the state’s argument that it was regulating commercial speech. 96 The Greater Baltimore court found that CPCs’
“clearest motivation is not economic but moral, philosophical, and religious,” rendering commercial speech doctrine wholly inapplicable. 97 Likewise, the Ninth Circuit decision reviewed in NIFLA determined that relaxed

91. Id. at 651.
92. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 559 n.8 (6th Cir.
2012).
93. Id.
94. See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“To be sure, determining whether a disclosure is ‘uncontroversial’
may be difficult in some compelled commercial speech cases, in part because it is unclear how
we should assess and what we should examine to determine whether a mandatory disclosure is
controversial.”); Mass. Ass’n of Priv. Career Schs. v. Healey, 159 F. Supp. 3d 173, 206 (D. Mass.
2016) (“It appears that few courts have considered the constitutionality of disclosure regulations that fail the ‘factual’ or ‘uncontroversial’ prerequisites of Zauderer.”).
95. See, e.g., Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795–97 (1988)
(applying strict scrutiny to compelled disclosures for professional solicitors after finding that
“[i]t is not clear that a professional’s speech is necessarily commercial whenever it relates to
that person’s financial motivation for speaking”); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n,
475 U.S. 1, 9 (1986) (holding that the publication of information by a third party in utility bill
envelopes “extends well beyond speech that proposes a business transaction”).
96. Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Balt., 879 F.3d 101 (4th
Cir. 2018).
97. Id. at 109; see also Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery County, 683 F.3d 591, 594 (4th
Cir. 2012) (concluding that strict scrutiny applied to CPC disclosure requirement because the
state “compel[led] noncommercial speech”), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 722 F.3d 184 (4th Cir.
2013).
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review under Zauderer was inappropriate, noting without further elaboration that the California law “primarily regulate[d] the speech that occurs
within the clinic, and thus is not commercial speech.” 98
In NIFLA, however, the Supreme Court did not address the possibility
that the CPC disclosures were noncommercial speech. Instead, the Court
ruled out the applicability of Zauderer by finding that the disclosures were
not “purely factual and uncontroversial,” implicitly accepting that CPCs can
engage in commercial speech, 99 but applying strict scrutiny before striking
down the law. 100 Rather than formally cabining the scope of commercial
speech, the Court relied on an underdeveloped and tenuous area of compelled speech doctrine to categorically prohibit all abortion-related disclosures. 101
The NIFLA Court’s reliance on the “purely factual and uncontroversial”
prong of Zauderer has not been without consequence. Since NIFLA, lower
courts have struggled to apply this nebulous standard, most notably in the
context of health and safety disclosures. For example, in American Beverage
Association v. City of San Francisco, the Ninth Circuit actively avoided determining whether a warning label requirement for sugar-sweetened beverages was controversial but struck down the disclosure as an undue burden
on advertisers’ speech. 102 In a partial concurrence, Judge Ikuta suggested that
she would have liked the opportunity to further define controversiality, explaining that “[a]lthough NIFLA did not define ‘uncontroversial,’ the warning here requires the advertisers to convey San Francisco’s one-sided policy
views about sugar-sweetened beverages.” 103 Based on her reading of the record, Judge Ikuta would have found that warning against the health consequences of sugar consumption “is a controversial topic, and therefore, the
ordinance does not qualify as ‘uncontroversial information’ under the third
prong of NIFLA.” 104
In CTIA–The Wireless Association v. City of Berkeley, decided a few
months after American Beverage Association, the Ninth Circuit upheld an

98. Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 834 n.5 (9th Cir. 2016),
rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
99. See Fargo Women’s Health Org., Inc. v. Larson, 381 N.W.2d 176, 178, 181–82 (N.D.
1986) (upholding preliminary injunction requiring CPC to refrain from using advertising that
“would lull people into believing that they are dealing with” a similarly named abortion clinic
as a regulation of commercial speech); see also Gilbert, supra note 19, at 612–15 (arguing that
CPC regulations should be considered compelled commercial speech).
100. Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372–78 (2018).
101. See Mass. Ass’n of Priv. Career Schs. v. Healey, 159 F. Supp. 3d 173, 206 (D. Mass.
2016) (“[F]ew courts have considered the constitutionality of disclosure regulations that fail
the ‘factual’ or ‘uncontroversial’ prerequisites of Zauderer.”).
102. Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City of San Francisco, 916 F.3d 749, 757 (9th Cir. 2019) (“We
need not, and therefore do not, decide whether the warning here is factually accurate and noncontroversial.”).
103. Id. at 761 (Ikuta, J., concurring in part).
104. Id.
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ordinance requiring cell phone retailers to warn consumers that they may be
exposed to excessive radio-frequency radiation by carrying a cell phone near
their bodies. 105 By finding that the disclosure was “factual and not misleading,” the court rejected petitioner’s argument that the disclosure was “controversial.” 106 The CTIA court interpreted NIFLA’s application of the “purely
factual and uncontroversial” standard to bar compelled disclosures only
when they forced an entity to “take sides in a heated political controversy.” 107
But as to the radiation disclosure at issue, the CTIA court found that even if
the parties disagreed about whether radio-frequency radiation is dangerous
to consumers, this disagreement was insufficient to make a disclosure controversial. 108 Therefore, although NIFLA’s holding was premised on whether
a topic was too controversial to be disclosed, the decision has left lower
courts with no guidance on how to interpret this amorphous standard.
B. Abortion-Related Informed Consent Requirements
Through rigorous efforts to avoid applying relaxed scrutiny to CPC disclosure requirements, courts have revealed that evenhandedness in law does
not apply in the abortion context. Although there are striking parallels between CPC disclosure requirements and antiabortion informed consent requirements, courts have made it all too obvious that only one ideological
view will be protected. At present, thirty-four states require patients to receive antiabortion counseling before obtaining the procedure. 109 The Eighth
Circuit upheld a South Dakota statute that requires doctors to tell patients
that an abortion will “terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living
human being.” 110 The Fifth and the Sixth Circuits have approved laws requiring abortion patients to undergo a medically unnecessary ultrasound to
view the fetus and hear a heartbeat while the doctor describes the image. 111
Other states require physicians to tell patients that medication-induced
abortion can be reversed, abortion increases risk of breast cancer, and abortion causes infertility—even though these claims are medically inaccurate or
105. CTIA–The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 928 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2019)
106. Id. at 848; see also Masonry Bldg. Owners of Or. v. Wheeler, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1279,
1302 (D. Or. 2019) (explaining that “[c]ourts have described ‘uncontroversial’ as referring to
the ‘factual accuracy of the compelled disclosure’ ” (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Wheat Growers v.
Zeise, 309 F. Supp. 3d 842, 851 (E.D. Cal. 2018))).
107. CTIA–The Wireless Ass’n, 928 F.3d at 848.
108. Id.
109. Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST. (May 1, 2020),
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/counseling-and-waiting-periods-abortion
[https://perma.cc/T2FB-ACQM].
110. Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 653 F.3d 662, 667–68 (8th Cir.), vacated in
part on other grounds on reh’g en banc, 662 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2011), and rev’d in part on other
grounds on reh’g en banc, 686 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2012).
111. EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Beshear, 920 F.3d 421, 424 (6th Cir. 2019);
Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 571, 574 (5th Cir.
2012).
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scientifically unproven. 112 Meanwhile, only one CPC disclosure requirement
implemented in the past decade has survived review in federal court. 113
The Supreme Court’s decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey provides
the basis for categorizing informed consent requirements as regulations of
medical practice rather than compelled speech. In Casey, the plurality upheld
an informed consent law requiring doctors to tell abortion patients the gestational age of the fetus and inform them of resources available for childbirth,
child support, and adoption. 114 The plurality disposed of Planned
Parenthood’s First Amendment claim by finding that “the physician’s First
Amendment rights not to speak are implicated . . . but only as part of the
practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the
State.” 115
Post-Casey, courts have consistently applied rational basis review to informed consent requirements by treating these compelled disclosures as regulations of professional conduct rather than compelled speech. 116 However,
in 2014, a circuit split developed as the Fourth Circuit struck down a descriptive sonogram requirement as compelled speech, invalidating a North
Carolina statute that “require[d] physicians to perform an ultrasound, display [a] sonogram, and describe the fetus” to abortion patients. 117 Unlike
other informed consent requirements, the Fourth Circuit distinguished the
sonogram requirement as “compelled speech, even though it is a regulation
of the medical profession.” 118 Although this descriptive sonogram requirement was virtually identical to a law upheld by the Fifth Circuit as an informed consent provision just two years earlier, 119 the Fourth Circuit found
that the speech required was “ideological in intent and in kind.” 120 The court
further explained that the sonogram requirements “extend[ed] well beyond”
the regulations other “states have customarily employed to effectuate their

112. See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text; see also GUTTMACHER INST., supra
note 109.
113. Evergreen Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 740 F.3d 233, 247–48 (2d Cir. 2014); see
also Malcolm, supra note 10, at 1149–58.
114. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881, 887 (1992) (plurality
opinion).
115. Id. at 884 (citation omitted).
116. See Lakey, 667 F.3d at 575 (describing the appropriate First Amendment scrutiny for
physician compelled speech claims after Casey as “the antithesis of strict scrutiny”); see also
Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 952–53 (explaining that states have “political control over
the practice of medicine” such that regulations of medical professionals are “subject merely to
rational basis review”).
117. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 242 (4th Cir. 2014).
118. Id.
119. Lakey, 667 F.3d at 573 (concerning a statute that required a physician “to perform
and display a sonogram of the fetus, make audible the heart auscultation of the fetus for the
woman to hear, and explain to her the results of each procedure”).
120. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 242.
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undeniable interests in ensuring informed consent.” 121 By requiring a disclosure “irrespective of the needs or wants of the patient, in direct contravention of medical ethics and the principle of patient autonomy,” the state
created an unnecessary risk of psychological harm to patients and unlawfully
interfered in a productive doctor-patient relationship. 122
C. CPCs as Pseudo-Professionals
CPCs—even when unlicensed—attempt to resemble professional medical practices and provide some medical services like pregnancy tests and sonograms. 123 But CPCs cannot be compelled to give informed consent
disclosures because they are not actual medical professionals. Moreover,
post-NIFLA, CPCs cannot be regulated like other commercial actors and are
immune from making disclosures about reproductive healthcare options because they are too “controversial.” This means that CPCs are afforded the
highest level of First Amendment protections against compelled speech, the
same given to a street-corner speaker engaged in core political speech. 124
On the other hand, abortion providers are regulated as professionals engaged in medical practice—rarely able to raise a cognizable First Amendment claim when the state compels them to speak through informed consent
laws. 125 In principle, when professionals engage in conversations with clients,
that should “trigger[] a contextual First Amendment review that is specifically centered around the social relation, as opposed to an abstract review such
as that traditionally applied to the street-corner speaker.” 126 Specifically,
compelling medical professionals to make disclosures is considered acceptable because “the physician-patient relationship is marked by an imbalance of
authority,” as lay patients readily defer to a physician’s word based on their
inherent trust in the medical profession. 127 This same logic extends to a
state’s ability to compel disclosures from a person or entity that disguises it-

121. Id.
122. Id. at 253–55.
123. See Rita Rubin, At “Crisis Pregnancy Centers,” Critics Say, Ideology Trumps Evidence,
320 JAMA 425, 426–27 (2018) (describing the confusion caused by CPCs that want to look like
full-service medical clinics and CPCs’ efforts to “obtain medical clinic status by incorporating
sonography,” to attract more clients with the offer of a medical service).
124. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 422 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“Our First Amendment decisions have created a rough hierarchy in the constitutional protection of speech. Core political speech occupies the highest, most protected position;
commercial speech . . . [is] a sort of second-class expression . . . .”); United States v. Grace, 461
U.S. 171, 180 (1983) (describing a public street as occupying a “special position” for receiving
First Amendment protection of speech in public forums).
125. See Post, supra note 116, at 952–53.
126. Halberstam, supra note 43, at 834.
127. Id. at 845.
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self as a professional to take advantage of the trustworthiness associated with
medical practice. 128
By contrast, states cannot constitutionally prohibit a person on a street
corner from speaking out against abortion, even when that person uses inflammatory rhetoric and displays inaccurate depictions of an abortion procedure. After all, “[u]nder the First Amendment there is no such thing as a
false idea.” 129 Moreover, “a function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute,” and controversial speech cannot be suppressed
even when it “strike[s] at prejudices and preconceptions and ha[s] profound
unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea.” 130 That same person
on a street corner could also give free advice on adoption services and attest
that they have come out to promote antiabortion options in service of their
faith, not for personal economic gain. Because the street-corner speaker is
merely offering a free, morally motivated service, a court is likely to find that
the speech is noncommercial and receives maximum First Amendment protection.
Like the hypothetical street-corner speaker, CPCs also express radical
antiabortion views and most CPCs are affiliated with religious organizations. 131 In addition, courts have found it essential that CPCs provide free
services because “the offer of free services such as pregnancy tests in furtherance of a religious belief does not propose a commercial transaction,” making more lenient compelled commercial speech standards inapplicable to
CPCs. 132 But CPCs do not deliver their ideological messages and free services
from a street corner. Instead, lay people wearing white lab coats in CPC exam rooms that are designed to look like medical facilities speak these messages and provide these services, all while reaping the benefits of faux
professionalism to coerce and deceive exceptionally vulnerable people.
While the NIFLA Court rejected the notion that “professional speech”
exists as a separate speech category warranting reduced First Amendment
protection, it also found that “[t]he license[] notice at issue here is not an informed-consent requirement or any other regulation of professional con-

128. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 460 (1978) (“In addition to its
general interest in protecting consumers and regulating commercial transactions, the State
bears a special responsibility for maintaining standards among members of the licensed professions.”).
129. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
130. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
131. Swartzendruber et al., supra note 8, at 14, 18.
132. Evergreen Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 801 F. Supp. 2d 197, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 2011),
aff’d in part, vacated in part, 740 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2014); see also Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Balt., 879 F.3d 101, 108 (4th Cir. 2018) (finding that “[a]
morally and religiously motivated offering of free services cannot be described as a bare ‘commercial transaction’ ”); Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery County, 779 F. Supp. 2d 456, 463–64
(D. Md. 2011) (noting that “[i]n providing these [free] services, there is no indication that
Plaintiff is acting out of economic interest”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 683 F.3d 591 (4th Cir.
2012).
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duct.” 133 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit has explained that a CPC disclosure
could not be considered an informed consent notice because “the pregnancy
centers that are subject to [the disclosure requirements] do not practice
medicine, are not staffed by licensed professionals, and need not satisfy the
informed consent requirement.” 134 These courts have determined that CPCs
are not held to the same standards as medical professionals and “must be
free to formulate their own address,” even when consulting clients on a medical issue. 135
CPC staff commonly present themselves as medical professionals even
when they lack licensure and offer actual medical care through pregnancy
testing and ultrasounds—intentionally avoiding the image of an antiabortion
zealot on the street corner. 136 Even more ironically, CPCs mimic the appearance of abortion clinics to attract clients who mistakenly think that they can
access abortion at the CPC. 137 CPCs also strategically establish themselves in
close proximity to abortion clinics to confuse and intercept patients seeking
actual abortion care. 138
During oral argument in NIFLA, Justice Sotomayor asked NIFLA’s
counsel about the deception featured on a CPC website. Justice Sotomayor
described that the CPC website showed “a woman on the home page with a
uniform that looks like a nurse’s uniform in front of an ultrasound machine.” 139 Additionally, the website included a page dedicated to abortion information in which the CPC claimed to “educate clients about different
abortion methods available.” 140 Justice Sotomayor ultimately asked, “[W]hat
is . . . misleading, incorrect, or suggestive [about] . . . telling people that, despite how the picture looks on the website, this is not a medical facility?” 141

133. Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2373 (2018).
134. Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Balt., 683 F.3d 539, 554–
55 (4th Cir. 2012), aff’d in part, vacated in part on reh’g en banc, 721 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2013).
135. Evergreen Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 740 F.3d 233, 249–50 (2d Cir. 2014).
136. See, e.g., Aziza Ahmed, Informed Decision Making and Abortion: Crisis Pregnancy
Centers, Informed Consent, and the First Amendment, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 51, 51–52 (2015)
(explaining that CPCs are intentionally designed to look like healthcare facilities and perform
ultrasounds and pregnancy testing); Bryant & Swartz, supra note 5, at 270–71 (noting that
“[l]ay volunteers who are not licensed clinicians at CPCs often wear white coats and see women in exam rooms”).
137. LastWeekTonight, Crisis Pregnancy Centers: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver
(HBO), YOUTUBE (Apr. 8, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4NNpkv3Us1I (quoting
antiabortion activist Abby Johnson explaining that “the best client [CPCs can] ever get is one
that thinks they’re walking into an abortion clinic”); see also Swartzendruber et al., supra note
8, at 16 (evaluating a sample of sixty-four Georgia-based CPC websites to find that 63 percent
of them “included abortion-related informational content,” and 17 percent used the words
“ ‘options,’ ‘choice,’ or ‘abortion’ in the website name”).
138. See MCINTIRE, supra note 5, at 5–6.
139. Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138
S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (No. 16-1140).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 21.
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Remarkably, the only CPC disclosure requirement that has survived strict
scrutiny in the past decade involved a requirement that CPCs disclose
whether they have a licensed medical provider on staff who provides or supervises services at the clinic. 142 Finding that New York City had shown a
compelling interest in “protect[ing] the health of its citizens and combat[ting] consumer deception,” 143 the Second Circuit gave approval to “the
common-sense notion that pregnant women should at least be aware of the
qualifications of those who wish to counsel them regarding what is, among
other things, a medical condition.” 144
Despite disagreeing about the substantive nature of the compelled
speech at issue, opponents of mandatory CPC disclosures and opponents of
abortion-related informed consent laws have made identical legal arguments. Both sides have claimed that compelled disclosures and informed
consent laws are ideological and content-based, urging courts to apply strict
scrutiny to what they see as impermissible content-based speech regulations. 145 Abortion providers have argued that antiabortion informed consent
regulations can cross the line from regulating professional conduct to forcing an unwilling speaker to espouse the state’s ideological message. 146 Likewise, CPCs have claimed that the state cannot force them to post disclosures
because they do not wish to promote the state’s pro-choice policies. 147 The
uncanny resemblance between these arguments suggests that CPC disclosure
requirements and informed consent laws are not so different and that the
governing doctrine should treat them equally. 148
But in reality, after NIFLA, CPCs are treated as street-corner speakers
even when they masquerade as professionals, thus receiving the highest level
of First Amendment protection for their antiabortion speech. The courts

142. Evergreen Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 740 F.3d 233, 246 (2d Cir. 2014).
143. Id. at 247.
144. Id. at 249 (quoting Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery County, 722 F.3d 184, 193 (4th
Cir. 2013) (Wilkinson, J., concurring)).
145. Compare Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 (2018)
(calling a CPC disclosure requirement “a content-based regulation of speech”), with Stuart v.
Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 245 (4th Cir. 2014) (agreeing with physicians that the informed consent law was “content-based and ideological”).
146. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 245 (explaining that an informed consent requirement is a regulation of professional conduct, but that compelling “display of the sonogram is plainly an expressive act entitled to First Amendment protection”); Am. Med. Ass’n v. Stenehjem, 412 F.
Supp. 3d 1134, 1148 (D.N.D. 2019) (“[I]nformed consent statutes may violate the First
Amendment rights of physicians if the state requires the doctor to communicate its ideology.”).
147. Compare NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2371 (explaining that a CPC disclosure requirement
compels clinics to “provide a government-drafted script about the availability of statesponsored services”), with id. at 2372 (asserting that CPC disclosure requirement did not fall
under relaxed commercial speech standard because it required a “controversial” disclosure).
148. See id. at 2385 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“If a State can lawfully require a doctor to tell
a woman seeking an abortion about adoption services, why should it not be able, as here, to
require a medical counselor to tell a woman seeking prenatal care or other reproductive
healthcare about childbirth and abortion services?”).
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have reached this result despite the large body of evidence that CPCs intentionally operate under the guise of professional medical practice to increase
their credibility. 149 Free from regulation, CPCs use manipulative and deceptive speech to persuade clients out of an abortion or make it extremely difficult for them to obtain one. 150 Meanwhile, licensed abortion providers
receive the least protection in First Amendment jurisprudence, as courts apply only rational basis review to state-mandated informed consent disclosures that can be medically inaccurate and purely ideological. 151
After NIFLA, CPCs remain free to deliver any message they choose, even
when their advice about medical conditions can cause serious harm to their
clients. This risk is not merely hypothetical. In one case, a young woman
from Oregon named Beth Vial reported that after an ultrasound performed
at a CPC, she was told by CPC staff that she was sixteen weeks pregnant. 152
The next day, Ms. Vial sought abortion care from a local hospital that determined she was actually twenty-six weeks pregnant. 153 Because Ms. Vial
was late into pregnancy, her physician was required to seek approval from
the local hospital’s board before performing the procedure. 154 After the
board denied her physician’s request, Ms. Vial had no other options for seeking abortion care in the state. 155 She then flew to New Mexico and had an
abortion at twenty-eight weeks, paying $10,500 out of pocket for the procedure and spending six days in New Mexico to recover. 156 Had Ms. Vial not
gone to a hospital the day after she went to the CPC, obtaining an abortion
would have been highly inaccessible or impossible, all because the CPC deceived her. In another example, a woman asked a CPC staffer about the price
of a first-trimester abortion but received a vague answer and was told that
she needed to come in to discuss her pregnancy. 157 At the CPC, a staffer took
down her medical history and forced the woman to watch a video that inaccurately described the physical and psychological dangers of abortion. 158 The
woman reported that she was then given a sonogram while being lectured for
almost twenty minutes. 159 When the woman attempted to leave, the CPC
staffer placed the sonogram probe back onto the woman’s stomach, holding

149. See supra Section II.C.
150. See supra Section II.C.
151. See Post, supra note 116, at 952–53.
152. Vial, supra note 62.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Vice News, The Fake Abortion Clinics of America: Misconception, YOUTUBE (Sept.
17, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g-ex4Q-z-is.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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it down until the woman physically removed the staffer’s hands from her
body so that she could escape. 160
Courts have now created the untenable and dangerous result that states
can more easily regulate the conduct of credentialed, licensed professionals
than CPC staff deceptively posing as professionals. Courts evaluating CPC
disclosure requirements have erred by parsing out each element of a CPC’s
speech-related activity and viewing those elements as happening independently, thus immunizing CPCs from virtually all compelled speech regulations. In doing so, courts have turned a blind eye to what CPCs are actually
doing and saying: using the trappings of medical professionalism to deceive
their clients.
III. PROPOSING SOLUTIONS
Although NIFLA bars states from compelling CPCs to make factual disclosures, states can still prohibit CPCs from making harmful and inaccurate
claims about a medical condition. This Note proposes three solutions to prevent CPCs from using deceptive practices and lying to pregnant clients. First,
states could legislate to prohibit CPCs from making false claims based on
their compelling interest in preventing fraud. Because false statements made
with the intent to deceive do not receive First Amendment protection, a state
law prohibiting CPCs from making fraudulent claims would receive only rational basis review. But after NIFLA, states looking to regulate CPCs would
be better off pursuing solutions that do not implicate speech. Therefore, a
second, nonspeech solution would involve using existing state laws that
criminalize holding oneself out as a professional to regulate CPC conduct.
Third, people injured by CPCs could use tort law to promote “meaningful
and necessary regulation of CPCs’ deceptive behavior,” 161 while still avoiding
implicating speech. Specifically, the torts of negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation should be added to the menu of legal claims available to people
who may seek recourse against CPCs.
A. Legislation Prohibiting CPCs from Making False Claims Guided by
Alvarez
The state’s power to “protect people against fraud . . . has always been
recognized in this country and is firmly established,” 162 and states should be
concerned that CPCs use false claims to defraud clients, potentially causing
them irreparable harm. 163 Although courts rely on many different definitions
of fraud, it can generally be captured as an “intentional misrepresentation of
a material fact made for the purpose of inducing another to rely and on

160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
Brown, supra note 74, at 274.
Donaldson v. Read Mag., Inc., 333 U.S. 178, 190 (1948).
See supra Part II.
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which the other reasonably relies to his or her detriment.” 164 While states
cannot sanction speech merely because it is false, or even because it is an intentional lie, the Supreme Court has made clear that “[w]here false claims
are made to effect a fraud . . . it is well established that the Government may
restrict speech without affronting the First Amendment.” 165
Because false statements made with the intent to defraud are unprotected by the First Amendment, states would be permitted to prohibit CPCs
from making fraudulent claims if they have a rational basis for doing so. 166
States seeking to curb CPC deception should pass legislation that prohibits
CPCs and other reproductive-health entities from knowingly making
fraudulent statements regarding the medical nature of pregnancy and the
availability of abortion—targeting false claims about the gestational age of
the fetus, fetal health, or the state’s abortion laws.
A plurality of the Court in United States v. Alvarez crystalized the First
Amendment principle that false statements do receive some protection when
it invalidated the Stolen Valor Act, a federal law that criminalized lying
about receiving military awards and honors. 167 In doing so, the plurality distinguished precedent suggesting that “false statements have no value and
hence no First Amendment protection” by pointing out that “[t]hese quotations all derive from cases discussing defamation, fraud, or some other legally cognizable harm associated with a false statement.” 168 The plurality found
that the Act “target[ed] falsity and nothing more,” as the government failed
to demonstrate actual harm caused by this type of lie. 169 Thus, the plurality
drew a clear line between the First Amendment protection afforded to false
speech versus fraudulent speech.
Writing in concurrence, Justice Breyer highlighted the importance of
narrow tailoring when a state seeks to criminalize false speech, sympathized
with the government’s purpose in passing the Act, and suggested that a wellwritten statute “could significantly reduce the threat of First Amendment
harm while permitting the statute to achieve its important protective objec-

164. 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 1, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2020).
165. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 723 (2012); see also Commodity Trend Serv.,
Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 233 F.3d 981, 992 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Laws directly
punishing fraudulent speech survive constitutional scrutiny even where applied to pure, fully
protected speech.”).
166. See Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., 538 U.S. 600, 612 (2003) (explaining that “the First Amendment does not shield fraud”); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528, 535–38 (1973) (articulating rational basis review for law intended to prevent
fraud); see also Liberty Coins, LLC v. Goodman, 748 F.3d 682, 693 (6th Cir. 2014) (applying
rational basis review to statute aimed at preventing fraud after rejecting petitioner’s First
Amendment claim, finding that the statute “neither implicates a fundamental right nor creates
a suspect classification”).
167. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 715–16.
168. Id. at 718–19.
169. Id. at 719, 726.
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tive.” 170 In a dissent joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, Justice Alito advocated instead that “as a general matter false . . . statements possess no intrinsic First Amendment value,” and where lies do not serve any “valid
purpose,” they should “merit no First Amendment protection in their own
right.” 171
In light of Alvarez, when enacting legislation designed to target CPC
speech as fraudulent, states would have to avoid several fatal pitfalls. First,
states must not single out or target CPCs as the subject of a law prohibiting
false statements relating to pregnancy and the availability of abortion. Second, states must prohibit false statements only in specific contexts and articulate an intent requirement in the statute. Third, states should clearly define
the causal link between the false speech and the alleged harms.
With respect to the first pitfall, the plurality and the concurring justices
in Alvarez expressed concern that criminalizing false speech “would endorse
government authority to compile a list of subjects about which false statements are punishable.” 172 Justice Breyer explained that “those who are unpopular may fear that the government” will selectively prosecute certain
groups for making false claims “while ignoring members of other political
groups who might make similar false claims.” 173
In NIFLA, one of California’s notice requirements seemed to directly
implicate the Alvarez Court’s key concern. The law compelled CPCs to disclose the availability of state-subsidized abortion and contraception; problematically, this disclosure requirement only applied to clinics with the
“primary purpose” of providing family-planning or pregnancy-related services. 174 Clinics with another primary purpose, federal clinics, and state providers that offered emergency contraception and sterilization services were
“excluded from the licensed notice requirement without explanation.” 175 To
avoid this pitfall, states enacting legislation that prohibits making certain
fraudulent statements related to pregnancy and the availability of abortion
would need to ensure that the law covers all entities that discuss pregnancy
and abortion. By making the legislation generally applicable, states could
protect against an objection to the law being underinclusive, since an underinclusive statute “raises serious doubts about whether the government is in
fact pursuing the interest it invokes, rather than disfavoring a particular
speaker or viewpoint.” 176
Second, any law prohibiting false statements must be narrow in scope.
In Alvarez, Justice Breyer identified examples of scope limitations placed on
other statutes that prohibit false statements—for example, “requiring proof
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 730, 739 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 746, 748–49 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 723.
Id. at 734 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2368–69 (2018).
Id. at 2369–70, 2375–76.
Id. at 2376 (quoting Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 802 (2011)).
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of specific harm to [an] identifiable victim[]” or limiting prohibition to “contexts in which a tangible harm to others is especially likely to occur.” 177 As
such, a legally viable statute should include an intent requirement, covering
only false statements used intentionally to “cause the deceived person to follow some course he would not have pursued but for the deceitful conduct.” 178 To avoid overbreadth by punishing any false statement about
pregnancy and the availability of abortion, a well-written statute would outline the context of the fraudulent claims it seeks to prohibit. Specifically,
such a law could limit its scope to false statements about pregnancy and
abortion made by individuals acting in their capacity as a pregnancy counselor or medical professional to clients and patients, spoken with the intent to
deceive. 179
Lastly, states should clearly articulate the causal nexus between the harm
they seek to prevent and the prohibited fraudulent speech. Because the “government cannot label certain speech as fraudulent so as to deprive it of First
Amendment protection,” states should be prepared to explain how false
claims about the nature of pregnancy and the availability of abortion cause
irreparable harm to pregnant people. 180 When CPCs intentionally give clients inaccurate information about the gestational age of the fetus or the
availability of abortion, they hope to deceive clients into delaying abortion
care to the point where receiving legitimate care is highly inaccessible or impossible. 181 CPCs frequently tell clients that they have “plenty of time” to
make a decision about abortion even when the CPCs do not have any information about a fetus’s gestational age and may even tell them that abortion is
available throughout all nine months of pregnancy. 182 Given that
“[t]reatment during pregnancy is extremely time-sensitive” and the “consequences of this misinformation for the pregnant woman’s health are astronomical,” states can easily identify a causal link between false claims and
negative health outcomes to bolster their regulation. 183

177. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 734 (Breyer, J., concurring).
178. United States v. Lepowitch, 318 U.S. 702, 704 (1943); see also Alvarez, 567 U.S. at
734 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Fraud statutes, for example, typically require proof of a misrepresentation that is material, upon which the victim relied, and which caused actual injury.”).
179. See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 723; see also United States v. Bonin, 932 F.3d 523, 536 (7th
Cir. 2019) (explaining that when a statute targets a “subset of lies where specific harm is more
likely to occur,” it avoids overbroad punishment (quoting Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 736 (Breyer, J.,
concurring))); Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 814 F.3d 466, 473 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding
statutes unconstitutional because the “laws reach not only defamatory and fraudulent remarks,
but all false speech regarding a political candidate, even that which may not be material, negative, defamatory, or libelous”).
180. Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 233 F.3d
981, 993 (7th Cir. 2000).
181. See Bryant & Swartz, supra note 5, at 272.
182. MCINTIRE, supra note 5, at 12; Amy G. Bryant & Erika E. Levi, Abortion Misinformation from Crisis Pregnancy Centers in North Carolina, 86 CONTRACEPTION 752, 753 (2012).
183. Brown, supra note 74, at 227.
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B. Using Existing Laws to Regulate CPCs
Under existing First Amendment doctrine, states should be able to use
fraud-prevention measures to prohibit false statements on pregnancy and
abortion. However, NIFLA demonstrates that even with sound legal backing,
it is unwise to implicate speech in the abortion-rights context. One alternative solution involves regulating CPCs under existing medical-practice laws
to avoid raising First Amendment issues altogether. Solidly pro-choice states
like California, Colorado, Illinois, and Vermont already have laws regulating
the practice of medicine that prohibit holding oneself out as a medical professional without licensure. 184 For instance, in California, anyone who “holds
himself or herself out as practicing[] any system or mode of treating the sick
or afflicted” without a valid license to practice medicine may be fined up to
$10,000 and imprisoned for up to a year. 185 These laws could be used to deter
CPCs from—and punish them for—engaging in deceptive practices that induce clients to believe they are receiving care from medical professionals.
States have a “compelling interest in the practice of professions within
their boundaries, and . . . broad power to establish standards for licensing
practitioners and regulating the practice of professions.” 186 Furthermore,
regulations of professional conduct are evaluated under rational basis review, even when the regulation of professional conduct involves speech (like
giving informed consent disclosures). 187 If states do not single out expressive
conduct because they disagree with its content, a person or entity is “not
shielded from regulation merely because they express a discriminatory idea
or philosophy.” 188
When CPC staff pose as professionals without a license and diagnose
pregnancy as a medical condition, raising a First Amendment claim to avoid
sanction would be ineffective because regulating the practice of medicine is
regulation of conduct, not of protected speech. By pretending to be medical
professionals, CPCs exploit the trustworthiness associated with medicine as
a social institution, all while performing services that should require informed consent. 189 Moreover, prohibiting people from posing as medical
184. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2052 (West 2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-240-107
(2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-240-135 (2019); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/3.5 (West 2012);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1314 (2019).
185. BUS. & PROF. § 2052(a).
186. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975).
187. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992); Pickup v.
Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1231 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying rational basis review after finding that a
statute “regulates only treatment,” such that “any effect it may have on free speech interests is
merely incidental”), abrogated by Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361
(2018).
188. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390 (1992).
189. Brown, supra note 74, at 272; see also Donald Anderson, A Case for Standards of
Counseling Practice, 71 J. COUNSELING & DEV. 22, 22–23 (1992) (listing ethical codes adopted
by a wide array of counseling organizations that require giving clients informed consent disclosures on “the extent and nature of services offered” before beginning counseling); Patricia A.
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professionals has a strong, well-defined relationship to the state’s interest in
promoting the health of its citizens. 190 As long as states evenhandedly enforce these licensure laws without primarily targeting CPCs, they will avoid
claims of viewpoint discrimination and pretext, thereby preventing First
Amendment issues from reemerging.
C. Torts of Negligent and Fraudulent Misrepresentation
Another possible way to regulate CPCs without implicating the First
Amendment is through tort law. Victims of CPCs’ deceptive practices could
bring claims of negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation. Professor Teneille
R. Brown argues that people harmed by CPCs could bring individual tort
suits “in tandem with public efforts to minimize the deceptive and harmful
practices of CPCs.” 191 She traces the philosophical underpinnings of battery
and assault claims, explaining that these torts were meant to function as
tools for individuals to seek redress for violations of their “personal dignity.” 192 In addition to remedying harm to an individual, tort suits based on a
CPC’s failure to obtain valid consent “might help redefine and reclaim” informed consent as a meaningful and beneficial practice in reproductivehealthcare settings. 193 Likewise, fraudulent- or negligent-misrepresentation
claims can help reclaim access to accurate health information by holding
CPCs liable for engaging in dangerous deceptive speech that harms pregnant
people.
Both fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation require the plaintiff to
demonstrate justifiable reliance. 194 For reliance on a misrepresentation to be
justifiable, the Supreme Court has said that the plaintiff must “use his senses” rather than “blindly rel[ying] upon a misrepresentation[,] the falsity of
which would be patent to him if he had utilized his opportunity to make a
cursory examination or investigation.” 195 In more concrete terms, justifiable

Sullivan, Public Perceptions and Politics: When Diagnostic Medical Ultrasound Is Employed as a
Nondiagnostic, Nonmedical Tool, 18 J. DIAGNOSTIC MED. SONOGRAPHY 211, 216 (2002) (arguing that “ethical” use of ultrasounds in CPCs requires “diligently obtain[ing] prenatal informed
consent in the initial office visit for the pregnancy”).
190. See Evergreen Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 740 F.3d 233, 246 (2d Cir. 2014).
191. Brown, supra note 74, at 247.
192. Id. at 248.
193. Id.
194. To state a valid claim of fraudulent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that the defendant “ma[de] a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or law for the purpose of inducing another to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon it,” and that it was
“justifiable” for the plaintiff to rely on the misrepresentation. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 525 (AM. L. INST. 1977). A plaintiff claiming negligent misrepresentation must show
that the defendant made a misrepresentation upon which the plaintiff justifiably relied because
the defendant “fail[ed] to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information.” Id. § 552.
195. Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 71 (1995) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 541 cmt. a).
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reliance requires a plaintiff to show that the false statement at issue was material and credible. 196 Materiality refers to a showing that the statement is of
“substantial importance to a person involved in the transaction in question.” 197 The credibility of a statement is demonstrated when it “is not so
preposterous or otherwise lacking in credibility that the plaintiff should not
have relied on it.” 198
If a CPC negligently or intentionally gives a client an inaccurate gestational age to inhibit them from seeking abortion care, the CPC should be liable for the consequences under the legal standards set forth above. 199 Since
CPCs present themselves as professionals and offer free medical services like
pregnancy tests and ultrasounds to draw in clients, the justifiable reliance
prong of fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation should be easily satisfied
in most cases. For example, it is infeasible to expect a pregnant person to
verify gestational age on their own, which in turn makes it justifiable that
they would believe that the person who performs the sonogram is providing
accurate information.
The case of Beth Vial, the young woman who was told by a CPC that she
was sixteen weeks pregnant when she was actually twenty-six weeks pregnant, exemplifies the potential utility of a fraudulent misrepresentation
claim. 200 If Ms. Vial showed that she delayed seeking abortion care because
she justifiably relied on the CPC’s intentional or negligent misdiagnosis of
gestational age, the CPC should be liable for the harm it caused her. Therefore, by using tort law in this context, injured CPC clients can assert their
right to the accurate health information that they need and deserve.
CONCLUSION
The uneven application of First Amendment principles to reach an antiabortion result in NIFLA has made a complicated doctrine particularly incoherent in the sphere of reproductive rights. By finding abortion-related CPC
disclosures to be too controversial, while also deeming them irrelevant to obtaining informed consent, the NIFLA Court has given CPCs unconditional
license to hide dangerous deception behind the First Amendment. With the
law on their side, CPCs will continue espousing medically inaccurate information and operating under the guise of medical professionalism to deceive
vulnerable clients. But something can and must be done.
Even after NIFLA, there is still a path forward for states that value preventing deception, providing consumers with important information, and
196. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 316 (5th ed.
2017).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See Bryant & Levi, supra note 182, at 755 (“[CPCs] are generally not medical facilities, but they purport to explain medical risks to patients. As such, they should be held responsible for providing accurate information.”).
200. See supra notes 152–156 and accompanying text.
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improving health outcomes through informed consent for reproductive
healthcare. Following guidance from Alvarez on criminalizing fraudulent
speech, states can legislate to prohibit CPCs and other reproductive health
entities from knowingly making fraudulent statements regarding the medical
nature of pregnancy and the availability of abortion. NIFLA signals, however, that states should avoid implicating speech altogether when attempting to
combat CPC lies. One solution that avoids implicating the First Amendment
is to enforce existing laws that prohibit holding oneself out as a medical professional against CPCs that masquerade as such. As a second solution, clients
injured by CPCs should file tort claims, specifically alleging fraudulent and
negligent misrepresentation, to vindicate their rights to truthful information
and informed consent. Despite the barriers imposed by NIFLA’s troubling
application of the First Amendment, states have opportunities to continue
the crucial work of mitigating dangerous CPC deception and promoting access to truth in reproductive healthcare.

